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On Cicero’s Interpretation of 
Katastematic Pleasure in Epicurus
Mathew Wenham
The standard nterpretaton of the concept of katastematic pleasure n Epcurus has 
t referrng to “statc” states from whch feelng s absent. We owe the prevalence of 
ths nterpretaton to Ccero’s account of Epcureansm n hs De Finibus Bonorum Et 
Malorum. Ccero’s account, n turn, s based on the Platonc theory of pleasure. The 
standard nterpretaton, when appled to prncples of Epcurean hedonsm, leads to 
fundamental contradctons n hs theory. I clam that t s not Epcurus, but the stan-
dard nterpretaton that generates these errors because the latter construes pleasure 
n Epcurus accordng to an attitudinal theoretcal framework, whlst the account of 
pleasure that emerges from Epcurean epstemology sees t as experiential. 
Introduction
Of the many hedonsts that ltter the hstory of western phlosophy, Epcurus s one 
of the best known. Hs fame, however, s largely the product of attacks leveled aganst 
hs system, rather than beng born of an apprecaton of hs phlosophy. The prmary 
reason, I clam, for the promnence of negatve accounts of Epcurean hedonsm n 
the lterature s the nfluence of Ccero’s nterpretaton of Epcurean pleasure n hs 
De Finibus Bonorum Et Malorum (De Finibus).1 In ths work, Ccero objects to a 
number of features of Epcurean ethcs, but he sngles out the concept of katastematic 
pleasure as beng the most dubous. Today, the “standard nterpretaton” (Splawn, 
2002:474) of pleasure n Epcurus, and n partcular, of katastematic pleasure, s, n 
ts fundamentals, the same account that Ccero gave. I wll argue that ths nterpreta-
ton s wrong because t necesstates an account of katastematic pleasure that stands 
n fundamental contradcton to certan, well-establshed tenets of Epcurus’ epste-
mologcal theory. 
1 All references to ths work are taken from the Rackham translaton n the Loeb classc lbrary edton 
(1914). Bracketed numbers refer to book and secton numbers respectvely.
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To ground the ensung dscusson, we can begn by lookng at what Epcurus 
hmself had to say about katastematic pleasure. Ths wll not take us long. Of Ep-
curus’ own reputed three hundred plus works, there remans only 40 aphorsms 
known as the “Basc Doctrnes”, a further collecton of 81 aphorsms, the “Vatcan 
Sayngs”, of whch tems from the Basc Doctrnes form about a quarter, three letters, 
and some fragments from a major work, On Nature, that have been excavated from 
under the hardened volcanc mud at Heraculaneum beneath Mount Vesuvus. In 
none of these does Epcurus menton katastematic pleasure specfically. We are left 
to rely on a quote allegedly taken from Epcurus’ On the Telos, whch appears n book 
ten of Dogenes Laertus’ Lives of the Great Philosophers (Lives). It reads: “Peace of 
mnd (ataraxia) and freedom from pan (aponia) are pleasures whch mply a state of 
rest (katastema); joy and delght are seen to consst n moton and actvty (kinesis)” 
(10.138).2 Ths quotaton, along wth varous allusons to smlar concepts n Epcu-
rus’ Letter to Menoecous, are thought to support the dea that katastematic pleasures 
are to be equated wth ataraxia and aponia, and that they are somehow dfferent to 
kinetic pleasures, whch arse n actvty. 
The evdence here, however, s so scant that, on ts own, t precludes any defintve 
nterpretaton of katastematic pleasure n Epcurus. Yet one nterpretaton emerged 
250 years after Epcurus’ death, and t has become domnant. Ths nterpretaton — 
whch s sometmes called the “standard nterpretaton”3 — we owe to Ccero. In book 
one of hs De Finibus, Ccero, through an Epcurean spokesperson, gves a detaled 
account of Epcureansm, whch he then, n book two, attacks pont for pont. In both 
books, Ccero makes the concept of katastematic pleasure central. Indeed, much of 
hs refutaton of Epcureansm hnges on what he sees as the mplausblty of the con-
cept. I thnk Ccero gets Epcurus wrong because the assumptons about the nature of 
pleasure that he brngs to hs nterpretaton of Epcurus nclne hm to naccurately 
characterse katastematic pleasure. Ccero dsregards mportant dfferences between 
hs preferred phlosophcal system and Epcureansm, whch, had he examned them, 
may have led to hs producng a more accurate account of the latter. Let us look now 
at Ccero’s nterpretaton and the prncples upon whch t s based.
Cicero’s Interpretation
Ccero’s nterpretaton and subsequent refutaton of Epcurus, as stated above, both 
centre on the vablty of katastematic pleasure. Ths s apparent n the openng 
remarks of book two of De Finibus. Ccero, firstly, suggests that a dscusson be-
tween he and hs Epcurean spokesperson, Torquatus, would be well served f they 
were to agree on a definton of pleasure. Torquatus reples that such a definton 
2 All references to ths work are taken from the Hcks translaton n the Loeb classc lbrary edton 
(1925). Bracketed numbers refer to book and secton numbers respectvely.
3 See C. Splawn (2002).
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s unnecessary because everybody knows 
what pleasure s. Ccero clams, then, that 
ether he or Epcurus hmself s ncapable 
of common understandng for ther deas 
on the subject are very dfferent. Ccero, 
of course, thnks Epcurus s n error; he 
wrtes: “...I venture to assert that Epcu-
rus hmself does not know what pleasure 
s, but s n two mnds about t...the un-
versal opnon s that pleasure s an actve 
stmulaton...” (De Finibus, 2: 6) Torqua-
tus complans that Epcurus would ac-
cept ths charactersaton. Ccero agrees, 
but remnds Torquatus that Epcurus also 
held bare panlessness — or katastematic 
pleasure —  to be a pleasure, ndeed the 
greatest pleasure. And t s commonly un-
derstood, accordng to Ccero, that mere 
panlessness s dfferent from actve stm-
ulaton (De Finibus, 2: 7–9). Ths open-
ng passage s revealng n that t ponts to Ccero’s underlyng assumptons. Hs 
asserton that t s unversally agreed that the word pleasure refers solely to “actve 
stmulatons”, and not to stable states, was prejudced, I beleve, by hs phlosoph-
cal allegance to the New Academy (Introducton to De Finibus, 1925:x). The New 
Academy, n turn, took ts account largely from the founder of the orgnal Academy, 
Plato. By lookng at the core aspects of Plato’s theory of pleasure, I thnk we can fur-
ther clarfy the character of Ccero’s attack aganst Epcurean hedonsm. 
The fullest account of pleasure n Plato s gven n the Philebus. In ths dalogue, 
Plato has Socrates clam: “Ths s the general formula: when the natural state of a 
lvng organsm...s destroyed, that destructon s pan; conversely, when such organ-
sms return to ther own true nature, ths reverson s nvarably, pleasure” (32b).4 
Ths makes clear the Academc dea that pleasures are motions between depleted and 
satsfied states. But ths s not a full statement of Plato’s concepton of pleasure. Later 
n the Philebus, a more precse account emerges n whch pleasure s taken to be the 
perception of a moton of replenshment (38a–40e). Understandng pleasure n Plato, 
therefore, also requres that we have a basc understandng of hs account of percep-
ton. In the Philebus, percepton s taken to be a presentaton to conscousness of a 
complex of memory, sensaton and feelng that, n ratonal bengs, manfests as a 
judgement,5 whch s wrtten, by a metaphorcal “scrbe n the soul”, and a pcture, 
4 All references to ths work are taken from Hackforth (1945).
5 “Judgement” here should be taken to refer not just to statements of belef but also to “propostonal” 
Marcus Tullus Ccero, by B. Thorvaldsen as 
copy from roman orgnal, n 
Thorvaldsens Museum, Copenhagen
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whch s panted by a “panter n the soul” (39a). So, n a pleasant percepton, when 
we are pleased at, for nstance, satsfyng our thrst wth a drnk of water, the percep-
ton of that pleasure necessarly nvolves a cognitive attitude,6 beng nscrbed n the 
mnd to that effect. Ths overvew of pleasure n Plato s, of course, too bref. Stll, 
these ponts are fundamental and largely uncontroversal. It therefore seems very 
lkely that Ccero, as a member of the New Academy, would have assumed the neces-
sty of both the replenishment element and the attitudinal element n any plausble 
account of pleasure, and n determnng the mplausblty of any other account, he 
would have used these elements as reference ponts.
We can see precsely ths nfluence n Ccero’s nterpretaton of katastematic pleas-
ure. Katastematic pleasures are charactersed, accordng to ths nterpretaton, by the 
absence of feelng as a result of ther beng devod of moton (“statc”) (De Finibus, 
2:v 14–v 19). The reasons for Ccero’s construal of katastematic pleasure as “bare 
panlessness” are lnked to the elements of Plato’s account wth whch we finshed 
the precedng paragraph. Frstly, because pleasures for the Academy are nvarably 
perceptons of replenishment, the kinetic brand of Epcurean pleasure, .e. the actve 
pleasures, gve Ccero the scope to account for all the psychologcal phenomena he 
thnks deservng of the name. But n book one, Ccero s offerng what he clams s 
an accurate interpretation of Epcurus, so he must gve some account of katastem-
atic pleasure. He consequently sets katastematic pleasure n opposton to the “ac-
tve stmulatons” descrbed n Epcurean terms as kinetic pleasures and casts them 
as “statc”. The second reason for Ccero’s dstnctve nterpretaton of katastematic 
pleasure relates to the attitudinal element of the Platonc model. On that model, as 
we saw, pleasures are dentfied wth perceptons of motons of replenshment. Gven 
ths, the attitudinal element of pleasure experence seems ntutvely plausble — “ac-
tve stmulatons” of the senses or of the soul alone do not escape the mnd’s notce. 
But where katastematic pleasures are taken to be motonless, unfelt states, cogntve 
atttudes cannot merely be an element n the experence of them; rather, they must 
be taken to wholly consttute them. Ths s because, n the Platonc perceptual sys-
tem, wth reference to whch Ccero was constructng hs nterpretaton, only “feel-
ng” and “judgement” evaluate the perceptual representaton.7 It follows, therefore, 
expressons of atttudes. Ths s evdenced by the fact that n the secton from whch ths passage s 
taken, Socrates s tryng to convnce Protarchus that pleasures may be true or false just as opnons 
(judgements) may be (see Frede [1985]). 
6 To extend on the prevous note: It may be argued here that a “pleasure” s necessarly a non-cogn-
tve atttude n so far as t does not express a belef, but rather expresses an atttude. Ths dstncton, 
however, does not hold for Plato. The judgements that attend our pleasures are “part and parcel of the 
pleasure as experienced” (Hackforth, 1945:78).
7 Taken n the context of present perceptons, the remanng elements, “sensaton” and “memory”, func-
ton respectvely to represent (as accurately as condtons allow) the world, and to brng to bear judge-
ments resultng from past perceptons. “Feelngs” whch may take on a postve or negatve character, 
emerge from the conjuncton of these elements (Hackforth, 1945:72) and “judgements” or cognitive 
attitudes unfy all of “sensaton”, “memory” and “feelngs”. 
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that f one of “feelng” or “judgement” s removed, the other bears the whole respon-
sblty for the postve or negatve apprasal of that percepton. 
Problems with the Ciceronian/Standard interpretation
The Cceronan nterpretaton of katastematic pleasure, whch has t referrng to 
unfelt, statc states, leads to (at least) one fundamental contradcton when appled 
to Epcurean ethcal theory. In hs Letter to Menoeceus, Epcurus refers to panless-
ness as consttutng the telos, he wrtes: “...the end of all our actons s to be free from 
pan and dsturbance, and, when once we have attaned all ths, the tempest of the 
soul s lad; seeng that the lvng creature has no need to go n search of somethng 
that s lackng, nor to look for anythng else by whch the good of the soul and of the 
body wll be fulfilled” (2006, www.epcurus.net/en/menoeceus). Later n the same 
letter, however, Epcurus also clams: “Pleasure s our first and kndred good. It s the 
startng pont of every choce and averson, and to t we come back, nasmuch as we 
make feeling the rule by whch to judge of every good thng”. If we accept the Ccero-
nan nterpretaton of katastematic pleasure, these passages, taken together, become 
problematc. If katastematic pleasure s the telos, .e. “the end of all our actons”, and 
s at the same tme unfelt, then t s dfficult to see why Epcurus would want to make 
feeling “the rule by whch to judge of every good thng”. 
I beleve that the nterpretaton commttng Epcurus to ths very fundamental 
error s mstaken. Now, n most cases, the msnterpretaton of one phlosopher by 
another would be largely nconsequental — we could merely uncover ts errors and 
dsregard t. But n ths case, thngs are dfferent. Ccero’s nterpretaton, probably 
owng to the dearth of other ancent sources, has been nordnately nfluental. Even 
today, nterpretatons of Epcurus that nclude the rudments of the Cceronan ac-
count are standard. Jeffery Purnton’s analyss of Epcurean pleasure n hs artcle 
“Epcurus on the Telos” (1993) exemplfies the tendency to accept Ccero unchal-
lenged. In the followng passage Purnton adopts the Cceronan noton that kata-
stematic pleasure s unfelt, he wrtes: “...t s not necessarly the case that the mnd 
wll rejoce when t focuses on the presence of painlessness n the flesh. For the flesh 
does not report that ths panless state s good...(katastematic pleasures) don’t feel 
lke anythng” (1993:302) (author’s talcs). Purnton s consequently forced to con-
strue katastematic pleasure as beng wholly consttuted by a cognitive attitude whch 
apprases that condton as pleasant (1993:302). And, though he attempts to present 
a more sympathetc account of Epcurean hedonsm than does Ccero, Purnton 
wnds up wth a smlar set of problems and seemng contradctons.
How, then, to show that the standard nterpretaton s mstaken? There are two 
ways to go. Frstly, we mght extend our challenge to Ccero’s credblty as an expos-
tor of Epcureansm by appeal to factors that bear ndrectly on hs nterpretaton. 
For nstance, we mght suggest that Ccero’s polemc ntent n book two of De Fini-
bus so based hs nterpretaton n book one that the latter cannot be trusted — we 
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mght, that s, say that book one s a setup. Alternatvely, we mght try to show that 
Ccero’s nterpretaton of Epcurus conflcts wth the other uncontested aspects of 
the Epcurean system to such an extent that t s mprobable that Ccero s correct. In 
ther work, The Greeks on Pleasure (1983), Goslng and Taylor make one of the few 
challenges to the standard nterpretaton by way of the first of the above methods 
(pp. 345–413). I have nether the space nor the expertse to attempt anythng smlar 
here. Nevertheless, I thnk a more effectve objecton to the standard nterpretaton 
can be mounted usng the alternatve method. Namely, I thnk the standard nterpre-
taton of katastematic pleasure can be shown to conflct wth clearly establshed, and 
wdely agreed upon aspects of Epcurean epstemology.
To begn defendng ths clam we need, first, to make a dstncton between two 
frameworks for pleasure theores: the attitudinal framework and the experiential 
framework. The standard nterpretaton dscussed above falls wthn the bounds of 
the former, whlst the latter, I wll argue, better fits the account of pleasure n Ep-
curean epstemology and s, therefore, the rght framework wthn whch to stuate 
any nterpretaton of Epcurean pleasure. Before gvng an account of these frame-
works however, t s essental to note the followng: Epcurus thought pleasure to be 
a unfied phenomenon. He clamed that t takes on two aspects (.e. katastematic and 
kinetic) nonetheless, he thought both these aspects speces of the same genus. There-
fore, f one aspect of pleasure on an nterpretaton necessarly falls wthn the bounds 
of one of the frameworks, we must then construe all that nterpretaton’s pleasures as 
beng explcable under that framework. 
What, then, consttutes an attitudinal theory of pleasure? Andrew Moore defines 
them as follows: “Attitudinal accounts clam that pleasure s an ntentonal state, such 
as a certan sort of belef or desre, drected at a feature of oneself or the wder world. 
It dentfies pleasure wth ths atttude, not wth ts experental object” (2004:9). It 
should be clear why the standard nterpretaton of Epcurean pleasure s an attitudi-
nal account. In construng katastematic pleasure as an unfelt state of statc panless-
ness, t becomes necessary that the bass of the state’s pleasurableness be identified 
wth the atttude drected toward the panless experence. Ths s because, n the 
absence of feelng, no qualty or property of the “motonless” experence could plau-
sbly be dentfied as pleasure.8 Experiential accounts are dametrcally opposed to 
attitudinal accounts. Accordng to Moore, experiential accounts clam that “plea-
sure s a dstnctve conscous experence or element n such experence” (2004:6). 
Experiential pleasure theores deny the possblty of attitudinal pleasures — such as 
the standard nterpretaton’s katastematic pleasure — because, on ths framework, 
pleasure s a qualty belongng to the experence tself, and not the atttude drected 
8 It mght be suggested that the sensatons one experences n such statc states could be pleasant n 
themselves, but, as we wll see below, Epcurus was clear n clamng that “feelngs” were both the bass 
of our assessments of good and evl (pleasure and pan), and were a separable aspect of sensaton, so 
such an approach would not be sutable n an nterpretaton of hm.
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toward t. If, then, we can show that Epcurus supported an experiential account of 
pleasure, t wll follow that the standard nterpretaton s based on a theoretcal foun-
daton that s fundamentally dfferent from that upon whch Epcurus constructed hs 
theory. At a mnmum, such a findng should gve us cause to be wary of analyss that 
has been bult on the ground that Ccero prepared. 
The “sensory” basis of Epicurean pleasure
So, dd Epcurus’ account of pleasure conform to the experience model? I thnk t 
dd. Indeed, certan of Epcurus’ basc epstemologcal commtments seem to de-
mand that we see hs theory of pleasure as beng constructed upon ths framework. 
To see why, we need to brefly examne hs epstemology. Owng to the promnence 
of sceptcal arguments at the tme, all the major phlosophcal schools of the Hel-
lenstc perod developed detaled defences of ther belefs n relaton to the relabl-
ty of sense-percepton. Epcurus was 
probably the first to employ a kanon or 
crteron of truth n the servce of such a 
defence (Long and Sedley, 1987:88). The 
crtera of truth are the ultmate means 
by whch one separates true judgments 
from false and the Epcurean crtera 
were sensatons, preconceptons and 
feelngs. For our purposes, the last of 
these s most mportant. On “feelngs” 
(pathe) as a crteron, Dogenes Laer-
tus wrtes: “The Epcureans affirm that 
there are two states of feelng, pleasure 
and pan, whch arse n every anmate 
beng, and that one s favourable, and 
the other hostle to that beng...lv-
ng thngs are (thus) well content wth 
pleasure and are at enmty wth pan, 
by the promptng of nature and apart 
from reason” (Lives, 10.31). The last 
element of ths quotaton — “by the 
promptng of nature and apart from 
reason” — ponts to the Epcurean no-
ton that one cannot deduce what the 
good s by means of ratonal argument 
alone, rather one meets wth the good 
n experence and mmedately recog-
nzes t. We can see more clearly what 
Marble bust of Epcurus. Roman copy of Greek 
orgnal. Brtsh Museum, London
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ths means for our argument n lght of the Epcurean dvson of the soul nto ra-
tonal and a non-ratonal elements. “Feelng”, n the epstemologcal context, refers 
to the ntrnsc postve or negatve qualty of perceptual experence, whch arses 
n the bodly, or non-ratonal, part of the soul (Annas, 1992:190–1; Epcurus, Letter 
to Herodotus, 52, 53). These are then passed to the ratonal part of the soul (Annas, 
1992:191–5). “Feelng” serves as the basis for the evaluatve aspect of cogntve at-
ttudes. Pleasure, therefore, on ths pcture, s an experiential qualty that determnes 
the postve or negatve character of a cogntve atttude; pleasure s not the cogntve 
atttude tself. 
If we accept that the concept of “feelng” has been consstently appled across Ep-
curus, Ccero, Purnton and Moore, and f we accept Moore’s dvson of theoretcal 
frameworks, we can, I thnk, confidently conclude that the standard nterpretaton s 
mstaken. Ths s because, as we have seen, the standard nterpretaton of the nature 
of pleasure n Epcurus conforms to the attitudinal theoretcal framework, whlst the 
nterpretaton that emerges from Epcurean epstemology construes pleasure as expe-
riential. But can we really assume that our use of concepts lke “feelng” s the same, 
or even smlar, across four phlosophers, three languages and twenty-five centu-
res? And are we justfied n acceptng Moore’s dvson of theoretcal frameworks, 
partcularly gven that so many phlosophers have used the concepts “feelng” and 
“atttude” nterchangeably?9 These are, of course, very dfficult questons and I cannot 
hope to do them justce here. I can, however, gesture as to possble responses to each. 
On the first pont, we tend today, n ordnary talk, to use the word “feelngs” to refer 
to subjectve emotonal experence and sensaton, and so dd Epcurus. It may be that 
concepts lke ths, whch are basc to our humanty, tend to be smlarly appled across 
cultures and languages. On the second pont, I thnk we are justfied n acceptng 
Moore’s dvson of theoretcal frameworks so long as the atttudes that the dvson 
refers to are stpulated to be the cogntve atttudes of ratonal subjects and not lower-
order affectve or emotonal atttudes.10 If full responses along these lnes can be made 
adequate, the man argument I have presented here should have consderable force. 
Conclusion
The standard/Cceronan nterpretaton of katastematic pleasure looks to be ms-
taken. Ccero’s Platonc assumptons n relaton to pleasure lead hm to nterpret 
ths condton as bare, unfelt, panlessness. Ths nterpretaton, when appled to 
Epcurean ethcs, produces contradctons wthn hs ethcal system. Ccero, natu-
rally, s comfortable wth hs own nterpretaton and he consequently rejects Ep-
curean hedonsm as nconsstent. Ths would be hardly noteworthy were t not for 
the Cceronan nterpretaton’s profound nfluence on Epcurean scholarshp to ths 
9 I thank an anonymous referee for pontng ths out.
10 On the dfference between cogntve atttudes and lower-order affectve atttudes see Aydede (2000).
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day. The “standard” contemporary nterpretaton accepts the rudments of the Cc-
eronan account and produces smlar nconsstences n ts explcaton of Epcurean 
ethcs. Epcurean hedonsm s therefore most often taken as beng of only hstorcal 
nterest. But there s a problem at the heart of the standard nterpretaton. Its charac-
tersaton of katastematic pleasure necesstates that ts theoretcal bass s attitudinal. 
However, when we examne aspects of Epcurus’ epstemology, t seems to demand 
that we attrbute to hm an account of pleasure that fits the experiential framework. 
Ths framework refuses any concepton of pleasure that locates t extrnscally to ts 
experental object — yet ths s just how the standard nterpretaton casts katastem-
atic pleasures. There are further questons to be answered about conceptual agree-
ment across cultures, languages and ages, and also questons relatng to the vablty of 
the dstncton between theoretcal frameworks upon whch my argument has been 
based. It s lkely, though, that there are plausble responses to these questons. We 
should, therefore, n our contnued examnaton of Epcurean pleasure and ethcs, 
be, at the very least, wary of analyss that has been bult on the ground that Ccero 
prepared. 
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